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that although these point in opposite directions (horizontal towards state taxes that are
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intensiﬁed tax competition always worsens their combined eﬀect. That is, intensiﬁed
lower-level tax competition—in the form of an increase in the number of lower-level
jurisdictions—is sure to reduce welfare, but this is not because, as usually supposed, it
makes excessively low state taxes even lower; rather, it is welfare-reducing either for that
reason or because it makes excessively high state taxes even higher. (JEL H20, H23)
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Until quite recently, the theory of tax competition in federal economies (meaning ones in
which there is tax setting autonomy at more than one level of policy-decision making) has
focused on the welfare consequences of horizontal externalities arising from the mobility
of tax bases between lower-level jurisdictions.1 The central conclusion from this work
has been that horizontal externalities tend to leave equilibrium lower-level (‘state’) taxes
too low, since each state ignores the beneﬁt it confers on other states by raising its tax
rate and so inducing outward movement of its tax base.2 More recently, attention has
turned to the key feature of the ﬁscal architecture of federal systems that tax bases are
co-occupied, implicitly if not explicitly, by both federal and state governments. This
co-occupation gives rise to vertical externalities between federal and state governments,3
which tend to leave state taxes too high: each state ignores the harm it does others by
raising its tax rate in so far as the induced contraction in the federal tax base leads to
a reduction in federal spending that harms other states too.
With horizontal externalities pointing towards state taxes that are ineﬃciently low and
vertical externalities towards state taxes that are ineﬃciently high, it is natural to ask
which will dominate. The answer, assuming governments act benevolently, is: it depends.
In a model of competition for mobile capital, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2000), in particular,
show that whether equilibrium taxes are too high or too low in equilibrium depends on
the elasticity of the demand for capital and supply of savings. But another question then
arises: Does an intensiﬁcation of tax competition amongst the state governments within
federal systems—conveniently parameterized as an increase in the number of states—
lead to a better outcome or a worse one? That is the question addressed in this paper.
We show that in this case the answer is unambiguous: it makes it worse.
This result may seem reminiscent of Hoyt (1991), who shows that an increase in the
number of states in the standard model of horizontal tax competition causes welfare
to fall. Here, it should be emphasized, the context and mechanisms at work are quite
diﬀerent. In Hoyt’s model there is no purposive federal government, so that state taxes
are too low and are made lower by intensiﬁed tax competition. In the present federal
context, in contrast, state taxes may be either too low or too high: the point is that
whatever the nature of the ineﬃciency, intensiﬁed tax competition makes it worse. If
taxes are too low, it makes them lower; if too high, it makes them higher. One does
not need to know whether state taxes are too low or too high in order to know that
intensiﬁed tax competition is harmful.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the background against
which the analysis is conducted; it presents a simple model of federal ﬁscal arrangements,
1Important contributions to the literature on horizontal externalities include Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1989), Hoyt (1991), Dahlby (1996), and Keen and Marchand (1997).
2There are cases, however, in which tax exporting motives can leave equilibrium taxes too high; see,
for instance, Mintz and Tulkens (1986).
3Contributions to this literature include Cassing and Hillman (1982), Flowers (1988), Wrede (1996),
Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault (1998), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2000, 2001) and Dahlby and Wilson
(2001). Keen (1998) surveys externalities, while Wilson (1999) provides a thorough review of the tax
competition literature.
1based on Keen and Kotsogiannis (2000), and brieﬂy discusses ineﬃciencies in state tax-
setting. Section 3 contains our main result. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The model
The economy consists of one federal and N ≥ 1 identical state governments. Output in
state j is F (Kj), where Kj denotes the amount of capital located in state j, with4
F
′(K
j) > 0 > F
′′(K
j) , (1)
and F (Kj) at least three times continuously diﬀerentiable. Capital is costlessly mobile
across the states and so relocates until it earns the same post-tax return ρ in each state.
Capital can be taxed by both levels of government. State j levies a source-based tax
tj on each unit of capital in its jurisdiction while the federal government levies a unit
tax—common to all states—at the rate T. The consolidated tax rate in state j is then
τj ≡ tj +T. Capital moves until it earns the same post-tax return in each state, so that
F
′(K
j) − τj = ρ , (2)
which deﬁnes the demand for capital Kj(ρ + τj) with
K
′ (ρ + τj) =
1
F ′′ < 0 . (3)










′ (ρ + τj) = −K (ρ + τj) . (5)
Rents in state j are taxed at the (exogenous) rate θ ∈ (0,1) by state j, and are not
taxed by any other government. In each state there is a single consumer with preferences
deﬁned over ﬁrst- and second-period private consumption, C1 and C2, the level g of a
local public good provided by the government of the state in which she lives, and federal
spending per state G. That is,
U(C1,C2,g,G) = u(C1) + C2 + Γ(g,G) . (6)
Both u and Γ are strictly increasing and concave. Each consumer in state j has an en-
dowment e of ﬁrst period income; in the second, she receives principal and interest on her
ﬁrst-period savings, S, plus after-tax rents earned in her jurisdiction. This speciﬁcation
of preferences implies that S′(ρ) ≥ 0, with indirect utility
U (ρ,τ,g,G) ≡ u[e − S(ρ)] + (1 + ρ)S(ρ) + (1 − θ)Π(ρ + τ) + Γ(g,G) . (7)
4Derivatives of functions of one variable are indicated by primes and of many variables by subscripts.
2Making use of (5),
Uρ = S − (1 − θ)K , (8)
Uτ = −(1 − θ)K . (9)
Denoting the N-vector of consolidated tax rates by   τ ≡ (τ1,...,τN), the net return ρ(  τ)
is implicitly deﬁned by the market-clearing condition
NS(ρ) = Σ
N









Throughout the analysis attention is conﬁned to symmetric equilibria: ones, that is, in
which all states set the same tax rate (τj = τ,∀j). The net return in such an equilibrium




S′(ρ) − K′(ρ + τ)
∈ [−1,0) . (12)






There are no inter-governmental transfers, either vertically between the levels of govern-
ment or horizontally across the states, so that state and federal tax receipts (per state)
respectively are






i=1TK(ρ + τi) = TS(ρ) . (15)
State (and federal) policy makers are assumed to be benevolent, in the sense that they
look only to the welfare of their own constituents.
Consider then the problem that the policy maker of the typical state j faces. Making
use of (4), (10), (14) and (15) in (7), welfare in state j is given by
Wj(τj,  τ) ≡ U [ρ(  τ),τj,tjK(ρ(  τ) + τj) + θΠ(ρ(  τ) + τj),TS(ρ(  τ))] . (16)
State government j then chooses its tax rate, taking all other state and federal tax rates
as given, to maximise (16). The necessary condition for this, evaluated in symmetric





















′ = 0 , (17)
which implicitly deﬁnes the state tax as a function of the federal tax and the number of
states in the federation.
3In choosing T, the federal government, playing Nash relative to the states, maximizes
W(τ,  τ) ≡ U[ρ(  τ),τ,tK(ρ(  τ) + τ) + θΠ(ρ(  τ) + τ),TS(ρ(  τ))] . (18)
The necessary condition for this, evaluated in symmetric equilibrium and making use of
(8), (9) and (13), is that
WT(t,T) = θKp
′ − (1 − θ)K + Γg(tK
′ − θK)(1 + p
′) + ΓGTS
′p
′ = 0 , (19)
which implicitly deﬁnes the federal tax as a function of the state tax.
2.2 Over or under taxation at the state level?
To bring out the potential ineﬃciencies in state taxation, write welfare in symmetric
equilibrium as
W(t,T) ≡ U[p(τ),τ,tK(p(τ) + τ) + θΠ(p(τ) + τ),TS(p(τ))] , (20)
and diﬀerentiate with respect to the common state tax rate to ﬁnd
Wt(t,T) = θKp
′ − (1 − θ)K + Γg
³
K + (tK


























The ﬁrst two terms within the square brackets capture horizontal externalities from tax-
induced movements of capital between the states, aﬀecting revenues from both the state
capital tax t and the state rent tax θ. The third term captures the vertical externality,
acting through tax-induced changes in the federal tax base, S. The precise details need
not concern us here; Keen and Kotsogiannis (2000) establish conditions under which
either the horizontal externalities dominate (in the sense that Wt(t∗,T ∗) > 0, so that
the state tax is too low), or the vertical externality dominates (with Wt(t∗,T ∗) < 0, the
state tax being too high).5
The concern here is with the welfare eﬀect of an increase in N.
3 The welfare eﬀects of intensiﬁed tax competition
In exploring the eﬀects of increasing N it is useful ﬁrst to consider each externality in
isolation. And here the key observation is that both become worse as N increases. For
the horizontal externalities—isolated by temporarily removing the federal government—
this is essentially the point made by Hoyt (1991), referred to above. (The result here
is somewhat more general, however, in allowing for a state rent tax; the proof, which
requires an additional and apparently mild condition—that each state’s optimal response
5Consistent with, and rationalizing, this usage, Appendices A and B show that Wt > (<) 0 in the
special cases of this model in which only horizontal (vertical) externalities are present.
4to an increase in the tax rate in all other states does not involve increasing its own tax
rate by even more—is given in Appendix A. That the vertical externality—isolated by
supposing there to be no inter-state mobility of the tax base—increases with the number
of states is shown in Appendix B. This reﬂects the common pool aspect of the situation:
as N increases, each state recognizes that a $1 reduction in federal expenditures induced
by an increase in its tax rate (through the consequent reduction in the federal tax base)
is now shared amongst more states, with less harm consequently suﬀered by itself.
Consider then the eﬀects of increasing N in the general case in which both externalities
are at work. Denoting the equilibrium state and federal taxes by t∗(N) and T ∗(N)
respectively, the eﬀect on equilibrium welfare W(t∗(N),T ∗(N)) of an increase in N,
treated as a continuous variable, is Wtt∗′(N) + WTT ∗′(N). Since Nash behavior by the
federal government implies that WT(t∗,T ∗) = 0, this reduces to Wtt∗′. Assume again
that the equilibrium response of each state j to an increase in the tax charged by all
other states is to increase its own tax by a lesser amount. With this and a standard
stability-type condition, it is shown in Appendix C that t∗′(N) has the opposite sign to
Wt(t∗,T ∗). Thus:
PROPOSITION: Suppose that federal and state governments play Nash, and that each
state would increase its own tax rate less than one-for-one in response to a tax increase
by all other states. Then an increase in the number of states strictly reduces welfare.
That is, whichever externality dominates in the setting of the state tax, an increase in
the number of states is sure to make matters worse. If the state tax rate tends to be too
high because of a dominant vertical externality, an increase in the number of states will
raise it still further; and if a dominant horizontal externality leaves the state tax rate
too low, an increase in N will reduce it still further.
4 Summary and concluding remarks
Previous work on the ﬁscal architecture of federal systems has shown there is a fundamen-
tal ambiguity in the direction of ineﬃciency in tax-setting implied by the simultaneous
operation of horizontal and vertical externalities. This paper, however, has established
that this ambiguity does not extend to the question of whether this ineﬃciency is more
or less important in federations with more lower-level jurisdictions: they are more im-
portant.
The model used here clearly has many special features, including, to give just one exam-
ple, the assumption that all states are identical. The assumption that all policy makers
act benevolently is especially critical.6 It is striking, nevertheless, that the conventional
wisdom that, when governments are benevolent, intensiﬁed inter-state competition wors-
ens ineﬃciencies, based on models which ignore the vertical externalities that are a key
feature of federal systems, tends to be conﬁrmed. The underlying reason, however, is
quite diﬀerent from the conventional one: the reason that increasing the number of states
6Keen and Kotsogiannis (2001), for example, show when governments are Leviathans an increase
in the number of lower-level jurisdictions within a federal structure analogous to that considered here
tends to increase welfare.
5is harmful is not—as is conventionally supposed—that intensifying horizontal competi-
tion makes excessively low taxes even lower; rather it is that it will either do or it will
make excessively high taxes even higher.
6APPENDICES
Appendix A: Horizontal externalities in isolation
This appendix veriﬁes the claim in the text that an increase in N reduces welfare when
only the horizontal externalities are at work.
Suppose then that there is no federal government and (as for example in the benchmark
model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)) that the aggregate capital stock is ﬁxed (so
that S′ = 0). From (17), and noting that now p′ = −1, the necessary condition for the
typical state j, evaluated in symmetric equilibrium, can be written as
∂Wj
∂tj















= 0 ≡ Z(t,N) , (A.1)
which implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium state tax as a function of the number of states in
the federation, t∗(N). That the equilibrium state tax is below welfare-maximizing level
follows on noting that in the present circumstances (21) reduces to Wt(t,0) = (Γg−1)K,
with (A.1) implying that Γg > 1.
The conclusion that an increase in N further reduces welfare then follows on showing that
t∗′(N) < 0. For this, note ﬁrst that t∗′(N) = −ZN/Zt. Starting with the denominator,
note—from (A.1)—that the eﬀect on ∂Wj/∂tj of an increase in the tax charged by all
states is the sum of an own-eﬀect from the increase in tj and a cross-eﬀect from the








where x denotes the common tax charged by all states other than j, and evaluation is
at tj = x = t∗,∀j. Now assume the second-order condition for the state’s problem is
satisﬁed, so that ∂2Wj/∂t2
j < 0. It then follows from (A.2) that Zt takes the opposite sign
of 1−dtj/dx, where dtj/dx = −(∂2Wj/∂x2)/(∂2Wj/∂t2
j). Under the condition stated in
the text, Zt is thus strictly negative.








′ + θK(1 − Γg)
¸
< 0 , (A.3)
with the inequality following from the observation above that Γg > 1. Thus t∗′(N) < 0
follows. ¤
Appendix B: The vertical externality in isolation
This appendix veriﬁes the claim that an increase in N reduces welfare when only the
vertical externality is at work.
7Suppose that there are no capital ﬂows between states, so that the net interest rate in
j, p(tj), is determined by the market-clearing condition that S(pj) = K(pj + tj). The
typical state j now seeks to maximize
W(τj) = U
µ





















′ = 0 ≡ D(t,T,N) .
(B.2)
Comparing this with the eﬀect on welfare of an increase in all state tax rates, (21), one
ﬁnds that Wt = (1 − (1/N))ΓGTS′p′ < 0, conﬁrming that the common state tax rate is
too low in equilibrium.
Thus it remains to show that in this case t∗′(N) > 0. For this, denote by H(t) the
best response function of the federal government, implicitly deﬁned by (19), but with
S(pj) = K(pj), and by h(T,N) the best response function of the state government
implicitly deﬁned by (B.2), but again with S(pj) = K(pj).















∗′(N) = hN/(1 − H
′hT) . (B.4)
Assuming that H′hT < 1 (a stability-type condition), t∗′(N) then has the same sign as
hN.
Note now that hN = −DN/Dt. Assuming that Dt < 0 (a condition related to, but not










′ > 0 . (B.5)
That t∗′(N) > 0 then follows. ¤
Appendix C: Proof of the main Proposition
The claim is that t∗′(N) has the opposite sign to Wt. To see this, denote by R(t) the best
response function of the federal government and by r(T,N) the best response function
of the state government, implicitly deﬁned by (17) and (19) respectively. Perturbing the
equilibrium conditions t∗ = r(T ∗,N) and T ∗ = R(t∗), gives
t
∗′(N) = rN/(1 − R
′rT) . (C.1)
8Assuming that the best response functions are stable, in the sense R′rT < 1, t∗′(N) then
takes the same sign as rN = −EN/Et, where E(t,T,N) is the implicit representation
of (17). Et can be decomposed into the two eﬀects identiﬁed in Appendix A, and so is























the second equality making use of (22). Thus rN has the opposite sign to Wt, and the
result follows. ¤
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